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Abstract 
A number of studies suggest that the Europeanization process has a profound impact on national labour 
market policies, but fairly little research has been devoted to the development of social assistance 
benefit schemes across countries and over time. Relying on two new indicators, benefit levels and 
replacement rates, we examine the impact of the Lisbon Strategy on national social assistance policies. 
We find no robust effects for the first years of the Lisbon Strategy. However, after its re-launch in 2005, 
the Lisbon Strategy has significantly contributed to increases of national social assistance benefit levels. 
In addition to the Lisbon Strategy, domestic political, institutional and several economic factors also have 
a significant impact on social assistance benefits.  
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1. Introduction  
Europeanization captures the impact of European integration on the member states. More specifically, it 
refers to the impact on national policies (Radaelli, 2002). In the field of social policy, the process of 
Europeanization is visible since the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy. After the Lisbon Summit in 2000, 
the fight against poverty and social exclusion has become one of the central tenets in the modernization 
of the European social model (European Council, 2000a). The Lisbon Strategy has been followed up by 
the Europe 2020 Strategy, which also puts forward delivering social cohesion as one of the priorities 
(European Commission, 2010b). A number of studies suggest that the Europeanization process has 
exerted impact on traditional welfare state programs such as labour market policies (Armingeon, 2007; 
Van Vliet and Koster, 2011; Paetzold and Van Vliet, 2014). Instead, fairly little research has been devoted 
to the development of social assistance benefit schemes across countries and over time. This is 
remarkable since these benefit schemes play a central function in combatting poverty and pursuing 
social inclusion. As the last resort safety net, social assistance benefits are important instruments for 
delivering social protection, which has been emphasized by the Lisbon Council in achieving its objectives 
(European Council, 2000a). In this paper, we aim to complement the existing literature by exploring the 
Europeanization of national social assistance policies.  
However, it is difficult to directly assess to what extent national social assistance benefit reforms can be 
ascribed to the Lisbon strategy. As suggested by Zeitlin (2009), assessing the impact of the European 
strategy might be over-determined due to its non-binding character. Hence, the aim of this study is to 
analyze changes in social assistance benefits in the presence of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and its re-
launch in 2005, and to explain the cross-national variation in the benefit policy changes, accounting for 
several political, economic and institutional factors. As such, we seek to make three contributions with 
this paper. First, in the welfare state literature a lot of attention has been devoted to the analysis of the 
determinants of the cross-national variation in the developments of total welfare state generosity, 
unemployment benefits and public pensions. The determinants of the variation in social assistance 
benefits have not been analyzed yet and this study aims to fill this gap. As a second contribution, the 
empirical analysis is based on two new indicators to compare the levels of social assistance benefits 
across countries and over time, namely net benefit levels and net replacement rates. Third, this study 
contributes to the Europeanization literature by analyzing the effects of the re-launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2005. This provides insight into the effectiveness of governance instruments which have been 
used for the coordination of EU social programmes.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the Lisbon Strategy and 
the mechanisms through which this strategy influences domestic policy changes. Section 3 discusses the 
measures and methods used in the empirical analyses. Subsequently, section 4 presents the results of 
the empirical analysis. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Europeanization of social assistance benefits 
Social assistance benefits 
Social assistance benefits are public transfers that are aimed at helping households to obtain an 
adequate standard of living and that employ a low-income criterion as the central entitlement condition 
(Adema, 2006; Immervoll et al, 2015). Since this broad definition encompasses several low-income 
programs in addition to basic allowances, such as child supplements and tax credits, ‘social assistance’ 
and ‘minimum-income’ benefits are used interchangeably in this paper. Dependent on the specific 
structure of the welfare state, social assistance generally functions as a last-resort safety net. That is, 
eligibility for social assistance arises if eligibility for other transfers is exhausted. In the welfare state 
literature, the effectiveness and efficiency of low-income targeting in reducing income inequality and 
financial poverty have been studied extensively (Smeeding, 2006). Recent studies show that in many 
European countries the levels of social assistance benefits are not adequate to lift households out of 
poverty (Nelson, 2013; Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2013). This paper aims to analyze the role of the EU 
policy coordination in the developments of benefit levels across Europe. 
 
Europeanization  
The past two decades are characterized by accelerating economic integration and increasing 
globalization. This has encouraged the EU to develop coordination mechanisms in order to deepen 
European integration, also in the fields of social and employment policies. The interaction between the 
EU and member states policies is called Europeanization (Vink, 2003). Europeanization can have both a 
direct and an indirect impact on national social protection systems, where direct effects result in 
implementation of EU social policies, whilst indirect effects entail the creation of a single European social 
model (Leibfried, 2000). In the field of social protection policy, especially with respect to social assistance 
benefits, the EU influence on national policies can be observed via the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy, 
and later the Europe 2020 Strategy.  
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Lisbon Strategy      
Already in 1992, the European Council suggested that the member states should recognize “the basic 
right of a person to sufficient resources and social assistance to live in a manner compatible with human 
dignity” under Recommendation 92/441/EEC (European Council, 1992). This recommendation sets out 
common criteria to ensure or maintain adequate social assistance in social protection systems. Together 
with other recommendations, the 92/441/EEC recommendation represents the first milestone for an 
evolution of the European policy against poverty and social exclusion.  
A new impetus was given in 2000 during the European Council of Lisbon. At this occasion, an ambitious 
goal was set for the period 2000-2010 for the EU “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council, 2000b). As part of EU social policy, the Lisbon 
Strategy is seen as a turning point in the European integration process and its social dimension (Saari and 
Kvist, 2007). The stand point of the strategy is to make sure that each citizen can count on basic rights 
and adequate resources to integrate into the society (Ferrera and Matsaganis, 2002). The actual launch 
came in December 2000, when the Nice European Council decided to strengthen the social dimension 
within the EU, that is, to fight against poverty and social exclusion. One of the objectives dealt with the 
most vulnerable groups where social assistance benefit schemes can play a key role (European Council, 
2000a).  
However, after five years of implementation, a mid-term evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy indicated that 
the outcomes were somewhat disappointing (European Council, 2005). In response to this critical point 
of view, the Lisbon Strategy was re-launched in 2005 by the Barroso Commission (Borrás, 2009). The 
revised Lisbon Strategy did not change the original goal of the Lisbon Strategy but oriented policy 
priorities to growth and employment. It was stressed that economic growth does not interfere with 
social policy objectives. The social model should be secured (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005). In the 2005 re-launch, the most important decision was the procedural re-organization into three 
main steps, namely the definition of a series of European integrated guidelines, to implement these 
guidelines through national reform programs, and to monitor the progress country by country and also 
on a collective basis (Borrás and Radaelli, 2011). Following theses procedural changes, the roles of the 
Commission, the Council and the member states have been redefined significantly and have become 
clearer. Especially, the re-launch in 2005 is taken as an attempt to address the criticism of the failure of 
the Lisbon Strategy in the first years. 
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Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
European level strategies influence national policy-making processes through the social OMC. Similar to 
other OMC processes like the European Employment Strategy, the OMC Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion was launched as a framework for policy learning and coordination (Barcevičius, 2014). Leaving 
the responsibility of social policy to the national level, the OMC encourages the member states to 
provide a solution to re-enforce the European social dimension by spreading best practices and achieving 
greater convergence towards the main EU goals. It involves flexible and non-compulsory 
recommendations using guidelines and benchmarks for political cooperation (Daly, 2006). Social 
indicators were defined, encompassing among others financial poverty, income inequality and long-term 
unemployment.  
In particular, the OMC social inclusion influences domestic policy reforms through three mechanisms. 
First, the OMC may have a normative influence. The principles and guidelines set by the Lisbon Strategy 
put “external pressure” on the member states. In addition, social inclusion policies are being monitored 
continuously, both by the EU and at the national level, creating external pressure on those involved in 
policy-making (Hamel and Vanhercke, 2009). Second, the OMC may function as “leverage”. On the one 
hand, the OMC has raised attention to poverty and social inclusion issues on the political agenda in the 
member states. On the other hand, social actors utilize different instruments of the OMC to legitimize 
their own preferences in aspects of the common objectives, targets, indicators, and peer reviews (Hamel 
and Vanhercke, 2009). Mutual learning is the third mechanism. To enforce the Lisbon Strategy guidelines, 
the OMC encourages the member states to diffuse good practices and common approaches, thereby 
influencing the domestic policy-making process. Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008) even suggest that this 
cognitive dimension has been the prevailing influencing mechanism. Mutual learning works as a process 
of mimicking, in which national or sub-national actors imitate successful policies of other members and 
avoid the costs of learning because of trial and error (Hemerijck and Visser, 2003). This cognitive 
mechanism may influence member states on social assistance policies in two ways. First, policy-makers 
can learn informally from their counterparts in international networks and from benchmarks as well as 
the best practices filed in the Lisbon Strategy documents. Second, the formally established institutions 
during the process of Europeanization promote the learning process. This effect is more indirect but 
once a strong discourse is formulated, it would be likely to envisage great impact on domestic actors (De 
la Porte and Pochet, 2002b).  
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Although the Lisbon Strategy provides promising objectives and specific guidelines, the actual influence 
on the national policy reforms remains unstraightforward (Borrás and Radaelli, 2011). An overly complex 
structure, multiple goals and actions, and an unclear division of responsibilities and tasks were 
responsible for the failure of the Lisbon Strategy in the first few years (European Commission, 2010a). 
Meanwhile, lack of action from the member states also contributes to the failing outcomes and there are 
no sanctions for those failing countries. In several countries governments have put national autonomy 
first or defended their own social models (Preunkert and Zirra, 2009).  
The re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy, however, came together with more profound national social policy 
reforms. For example, the new social democratic government of Germany that came into force in 2005 
highly supported the social dimension of European integration and pursued reforms that were in line 
with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy since then (Büchs and Hinrichs, 2007). Another example is 
Spain where the revised Lisbon Strategy was translated into a more specific National Reform Programme 
that re-orientated preferences to three pillars: employment, social protection and environment (Guillén, 
2007).  
As part of social protection, social assistance benefits have received a lot of attention recently (Nelson, 
2008, 2010; Marchal et al, 2014). However, there is no research on how benefit reforms in this field are 
related to the Lisbon Strategy. In accordance with the observations above, we expect that the Lisbon 
Strategy had a positive impact on social assistance benefit schemes. The impact is expected to be greater 
after the re-launch. 
Domestic politics and institutions 
An important feature of Europeanization is that the impact of European integration on national policy-
making depends on domestic institutions and political actors. This applies also to the OMC Social 
Inclusion as a legally non-binding means of governance. In the welfare state literature, partisan 
preferences are traditionally considered to play an important role in the direction of policy reforms 
(Hicks and Swank, 1992; Allan and Scruggs, 2004). The general proposition is that left-wing parties are 
more in favor of more generous social transfers than right-wing parties (Amble et al, 2006; Cusack et al, 
2006). This claim has been examined thoroughly for several types of welfare state programs, but the 
available theoretical and empirical underpinning for social assistance is much thinner. In this respect, 
Jessoula (2014) argues that left- and right-wing preferences might differ from the general proposition. 
Left-wing parties may be more likely to support broader (occupational) social insurance programs rather 
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than social assistance benefits and right-wing parties may support social assistance benefits as a less 
expensive program to help those harmed by market failures than social insurance programs. To account 
for these effects, we test to what extent left-wing parties are positively related to social assistance 
benefits levels.    
Similarly, trade unions can generally be considered as important actors in welfare state reforms in the 
sense that they are strong defenders of social insurance programs (Anderson, 2001; Starke, 2006). This 
also applies to the domestic impact of the OMC Social Inclusion when social partners are consulted in the 
policy-making processes (Jacobsson and Johansson, 2009). However, it is not on beforehand clear 
whether trade unions have similar policy preferences regarding social assistance benefits as they have 
with respect to social insurances. Another difference is that in many countries trade unions have 
institutionalized channels of influence in labor market policy reforms as they are involved in the 
organization of employee insurances, whereas they have no formal responsibility in the provision of 
minimum income protection (Clegg, 2014). Hence, we test whether a positive association between the 
strength of trade unions and benefit levels also applies to social assistance.   
Furthermore, political institutions are often considered as relevant factors in welfare state reforms. In 
majoritarian electoral systems, the inclusiveness of representation is weaker than in proportional 
representation electoral systems. Hence, the latter system provides more institutional opportunities for 
parties with egalitarian policy goals to resist benefit cuts (Swank, 2002). Therefore, it can be expected 
that proportional representation electoral systems are positively related to social assistance benefit 
levels.       
Socioeconomic developments 
In addition to Europanization and domestic political institutions, the comparative welfare state literature 
indicates that social assistance benefit reforms may also be triggered or affected by a number of socio-
economic developments. High levels of unemployment lead to higher expenditures on unemployment 
and social assistance benefits. The resulting budgetary pressure may trigger social assistance benefit 
reforms. Hence, it can be expected that unemployment levels and budget deficits are negatively 
associated with social assistance benefit levels  (Korpi and Palme, 2003). Furthermore, GDP per capita is 
a conventional variable in the welfare state literature. According to Wagner’s law,  more economically 
developed countries have more generous social protection systems (Hays et al, 2005). Welfare state 
reforms may also be influenced by globalization. There are two central hypotheses regarding the 
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relationship between globalization and welfare state reform. According to the efficiency hypothesis, 
governments implement efficiency-oriented reforms in order to offer attractive conditions for firms 
(Garret and Mitchell, 2001). In contrast, the compensation hypothesis states that governments expand 
welfare states to compensate people who face increased economic risks as a result of globalization 
(Rodrik, 1998). In addition to the effects of globalization, increased economic risks may also stem from 
structural changes on domestic labor markets (Iversen and Cusack, 2000). We test the hypothesis that 
deindustrialization is positively related to social assistance benefits. 
 
3. Data and methods 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable of this study is the change of social assistance benefit levels. We use two 
indicators to measure these benefit levels. First, we use the real net benefit level, which is a relatively 
straightforward measure of the generosity of social assistance benefits (Olaskoaga et al, 2013). Data on 
benefit levels are taken from the Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013). Net 
minimum income benefits are defined as the net income from a benefit package consisting of basic 
social assistance, child supplements, refundable tax credits, and other benefits.2 These benefit levels are 
expressed in U.S. dollars, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and inflation (CPI 2005=100), which 
enables us to compare benefits across countries and over time. Data on PPPs are taken from the Penn 
World Table (Heston et al, 2012) and for the CPI we use data from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2012). To examine the generosity of social assistance benefits relative to the wages in a 
country, we use the net minimum income replacement rate as second indicator. This measure is defined 
as the ratio of the net benefit level to the net average production worker wage. As such, this minimum 
income replacement rate is constructed in a similar way as, and so comparable to, unemployment 
benefit replacement rates (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012). However, it should 
be noted that the interpretation of the term minimum income replacement rate is slightly different from 
the unemployment replacement rate, although they share the same denominator. Since unemployed 
workers usually receive unemployment benefits first before they are entitled to social assistance 
benefits, the minimum income replacement rate does not indicate the fraction of the income from work 
that is actually “replaced” by income transfer programs, as is the case for the unemployment 
replacement rate.  
                                                          
2 One-time social assistance payments to cover unexpected and urgent needs or regular supplements to cover exceptional 
needs are not included in this benefit package.  
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Although replacement rates can be seen as useful measures to compare social rights across countries 
and over time, they have a number of limitations too (Whiteford, 1995; Danforth and Stephens, 2013). A 
first limitation is that it is often difficult to capture the duration of benefit programmes with replacement 
rates. Arguably, this issue does not seem to apply as much to social assistance benefits as it does to 
unemployment benefits, as there is often no maximum duration for social assistance benefits, whereas 
in many countries the duration of unemployment benefits is maximized (Wang and Van Vliet, 2014). 
Similarly, social assistance benefit levels are – in absence of policy reforms - usually constant over time, 
whereas for instance unemployment benefit levels can vary over the unemployment spell of an 
individual. Furthermore, social assistance benefit levels are usually the same for all beneficiaries as they 
are not related to previous earned income, whereas unemployment or disability benefits vary across 
individuals. 
For both the real benefit level and the replacement rate, we take an average of the indicators calculated 
for three household types: single persons, lone parents with two children and households with two 
parents and two children.3  
 
Europeanization and institutional variables 
This study is conducted to examine whether and how Europeanization affects national social assistance 
policies. First, we include a variable capturing the effect of the Lisbon Strategy 2000. Specified as a 
dichotomous variable, it is scored 0 for the years before 2005 and 1 afterwards. As a second 
Europeanization variable, we include a dichotomous variable that is scored 0 before 2005 and 1 
afterwards to assess the impact of the revised Lisbon Strategy.  
To examine the role of domestic politics and trade unions in social assistance benefit reform, we include 
the percentage of total cabinet posts held by left-wing parties and union density respectively. Data for 
left-wing parties and union density are taken from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al, 
2012). To account for the variation in national electoral institutions, we include a dummy variable scored 
1 for a proportional representation system and 0 otherwise. Data are derived from the Dataset of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001). 
 
Socioeconomic variables 
                                                          
3 See Wang and Van Vliet (2014) for the developments of social assistance benefits per household type.  
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To account for the constraining effect of unemployment on social policy budgets, we use unemployment 
rate data from the World Development Indicators Dataset (World Bank, 2012). Data on budget deficits 
are obtained from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al, 2012). For GDP per capita, the 
study relies on the Penn World Table (Heston et al, 2012). In addition, we use trade openness and capital 
openness to control for the effects of economic openness of a country, using data from the World 
Development Indicators Dataset (World Bank, 2012). Finally, Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) measure of 
deindustrialization is constructed based on data from the OECD Labour Statistics (2015). 
Method  
The analyses are based on time-series-cross-section data for 21 OECD countries, including 14 Western EU 
countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We also include 7 non-EU OECD 
countries – Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. The 
comparison of the developments between EU and non-EU countries allows us to trace the effects of 
Europeanization. The year 1990 is taken as the first data year, since earlier data on social assistance 
benefits are not available. The analysis ends in 2009, because this is the last year of the Lisbon Strategy. 
Its successor, the Europe 2020 Strategy, was launched by the Commission in 2010. As this coincides with 
the peak of the economic crisis, it is hardly possible to distinguish the impact of Europe 2020 on 
domestic social policy reform from the impact of the crisis. Therefore, Europe 2020 is not included in the 
analysis.    
To analyze the data, the study relies on an error correction model (ECM). In an ECM, first-differences of 
the dependent variable are regressed on the lagged level of the dependent variable and on both the 
first-differences and the lagged levels of the independent variables. Short-term transitory effects are 
captured by the first differenced variables and long-term structural effects are captured by the lagged 
levels (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Our estimations take the following form: 
 
∆Yi,t = α + βYi,t-1 + ∑δjXi,t-1 + ∑ϒj∆Xi,t + εi,t      (1) 
 
Here, α refers to the intercept. ∆Yi,t stands for the changes in the dependent variable in country i and 
year t. Yi,t-1 represents the lagged levels of the dependent variable. The first differences and lagged levels 
of the explanatory variables are expressed by ∆Xi,t and Xi,t-1 respectively and εi,t is the error term. Long-
term effects of the levels (Xi,t-1) are calculated by (ϒj/-β).     
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An ECM accounts for problems of autocorrelation and non-stationarity. Furthermore, panel-corrected 
standard errors are used to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial 
correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995). The main regressions do not include fixed effects, as a dynamic model 
may generate inconsistent estimations in that case (Nickell, 1981). However, fixed effects models will be 
presented as robustness checks.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Trends in the minimum income indicators 
Table 1 presents the developments of the real levels of annual net minimum income benefits over the 
period 1990-2009. The data show that the minimum income benefit levels, expressed in real U.S. dollars 
(CPI 2005=100), vary substantially across countries. In 2009, the highest benefit levels could be observed 
in Luxembourg, followed by Japan, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy. Portugal, Spain and the United States are 
the countries with the lowest benefit levels. Remarkably, between 1990 and 2005, the average benefits 
are higher in the non-EU OECD countries than in the EU countries. In 2009, however, benefit levels were 
on average higher in the EU countries than in the non-EU countries.   
The data show considerable variation over time. In most countries, benefit levels have been raised in real 
terms between 1990 and 2009, implying that the increase of the benefit levels exceeded that of the 
consumer prices. The largest increases occurred in Luxembourg, Japan and Denmark. Meanwhile, there 
are also several countries where benefit levels were reduced in this period. The sharpest decrease can be 
observed in Spain, followed by Finland. Interestingly, for both country groups, the benefit levels on 
average decreased before 2000. However, after 2000 and especially after 2005, the benefit levels began 
to show substantial increases.  
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Table 1. Real minimum income benefit levels, 1990-2009 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 change  
1990-2009 
Australia 12,231 13,524 13,870 16,163 16,874 4,643 
Austria 10,545 11,484 11,311 11,601 12,398 1,853 
Belgium 12,452 13,696 12,811 13,261 14,861 2,408 
Canada 16,311 16,323 13,072 12,851 13,924 -2,387 
Denmark 10,806 15,777 16,594 17,955 18,247 7,441 
Finland 13,158 10,698 9,548 10,192 10,263 -2,895 
France 7,195 7,796 8,474 8,721 9,090 1,895 
Germany 9,239 9,767 9,640 11,724 11,998 2,760 
Ireland 11,434 10,889 10,680 12,986 17,680 6,246 
Italy 19,735 11,223 13,096 14,882 17,092 -2,643 
Japan 11,174 12,403 13,671 16,659 18,643 7,469 
Luxembourg 13,877 20,275 19,422 21,977 27,923 14,047 
Netherlands 14,723 16,572 14,998 14,841 17,179 2,456 
New Zealand 10,096 9,709 9,736 10,854 11,417 1,321 
Norway 9,250 11,821 13,938 13,507 12,819 3,570 
Portugal . 5,226 5,542 6,071 6,787 . 
Spain 16,153 8,870 7,643 7,786 8,134 -8,019 
Sweden 11,081 10,068 8,756 9,468 9,775 -1,306 
Switzerland 11,145 11,219 12,654 11,497 11,637 492 
United Kingdom 9,006 9,032 10,341 11,413 13,001 3,994 
United States 9,623 8,920 7,956 7,805 7,497 -2,126 
       
Mean OECD-21 . 11,681 11,607 12,486 13,678 . 
Standard deviation . 3,432 3,295 3,769 4,896 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.36 . 
       
Mean EU-14 . 11,527 11,347 12,349 13,888 . 
Standard deviation . 3,903 3,547 3,901 5,171 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.37 . 
Note: Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005=100) and PPP; simple average of minimum income 
benefits of three household types: single person, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children.  
Data years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991), and around 1995 (Portugal, 1996). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Table 2 presents the developments of the net minimum income replacement rates between 1990 and 
2009. As is the case for benefit levels, the minimum income replacement rates varied considerably 
across countries. In 2009 Luxembourg and Italy had the highest replacement rates, while the United 
States was the country with the lowest replacement rate. In most countries, replacement rates declined 
during the 1990s. In the EU countries, replacement rates increased in particular after 2005.  
Interestingly, the ranking of replacement rates is not completely in line with the ranking of the benefit 
levels, reflecting differences in the wage levels across countries. For instance, from 2000 onwards, 
Portugal had below-average benefit levels whilst it had above-average replacement rates. For most 
countries, the real benefit levels and the replacement rates show parallel developments. For example, in 
Austria, Denmark and Germany, both indicators show an increase, whereas Canada, Finland and the 
United States experienced decreases in both indicators. However, in Australia, Belgium and the 
Netherlands the benefit levels increased but replacement rates dropped. In Italy, the benefit level was 
reduced, but the replacement rate increased between 1990 and 2009. Overall,  the correlation between 
the benefit level and replacement rate is 0.7. 
Finally, for both indicators, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation increased both within 
and outside the EU. The diverging trend of minimum income benefit schemes is remarkable, as 
convergence has been found for many other welfare state programs (Caminada et al, 2010).  
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Table 2. Minimum income replacement rates, 1990-2009 
  
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 change  1990-2009 
Australia 47.8 47.5 45.7 45.3 40.9 -6.9 
Austria 43.4 45.1 43.5 43.7 44.4 1.0 
Belgium 47.7 48.5 47.7 46.3 47.3 -0.4 
Canada 61.0 60.7 47.7 41.7 42.7 -18.3 
Denmark 53.2 67.4 67.2 64.6 61.7 8.5 
Finland 58.6 53.4 46.0 41.2 39.0 -19.6 
France 40.6 40.4 40.6 39.1 38.0 -2.5 
Germany 36.6 37.6 33.6 38.3 36.9 0.3 
Ireland 48.4 46.9 39.9 44.4 50.9 2.5 
Italy 57.7 53.8 56.1 62.4 67.1 9.3 
Japan 54.0 55.9 56.4 57.5 59.6 5.6 
Luxembourg 46.7 60.2 56.9 59.7 72.2 25.5 
Netherlands 59.3 60.9 55.3 48.8 51.7 -7.6 
New Zealand 50.8 47.4 42.5 43.1 38.0 -12.9 
Norway 39.7 44.5 51.7 45.1 41.9 2.1 
Portugal . 45.3 49.0 49.9 49.7 . 
Spain 50.9 39.5 34.0 35.0 34.0 -16.9 
Sweden 60.9 58.9 44.4 43.1 38.7 -22.2 
Switzerland 38.7 38.1 41.4 32.9 30.8 -8.0 
United Kingdom 38.0 39.9 38.5 37.5 41.8 3.8 
United States 35.0 32.3 26.8 24.6 22.5 -12.5 
 
      
Mean OECD-21 . 48.8 45.9 45.0 45.2 . 
Standard deviation . 9.4 9.3 9.8 12.1 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.27 . 
 
      
Mean EU-14 . 49.8 46.6 46.7 48.1 . 
Standard deviation . 9.4 9.1 9.4 11.8 . 
Coefficient of variation . 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.25 . 
Note:  Simple average of minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single persons, lone parents with two 
children and two parents with two children.  
 Data years are around 1995 (Portugal, 1996). 
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (Nelson, 2013) and own calculations.  
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Regression results 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3. First and foremost, both the Lisbon Strategy 2000 
and the revised Lisbon Strategy 2005 are positively and significantly related to real minimum income 
benefits and minimum income replacement rates. In line with our hypothesis, these results suggest that 
the Lisbon Strategy 2000 and 2005 have contributed to positive developments of minimum income 
benefits.  
Regarding the domestic politics variables, the results indicate that left-wing governments have a positive 
and significant effect on social assistance benefits in the short run. This result seems to suggest that the 
general hypothesis that left-wing parties have a preference for more generous welfare states also applies 
to social assistance benefits. However, this result should be interpreted with caution, as the coefficients 
for replacement rates and for the long-run effects are positive but insignificant. The results for the role 
of trade unions are comparable in this respect. The positive and significant short-run effect for 
replacement rates suggests that trade unions act as defenders of social assistance, as they also do for 
social insurance programs. However, the evidence is weak, as the coefficients for the benefit levels and 
the long-run effects are insignificant. Furthermore, the results indicate that proportional representation 
electoral systems are positively related to social assistance benefit levels, which corresponds to our 
expectations.       
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, the effect of unemployment supports our hypothesis that rising 
unemployment has been followed by retrenchments of social assistance benefits. We find a negative and 
significant sign for government deficits, which is in line with studies on labor market programs (Allan and 
Scruggs, 2004). Interestingly, the coefficient for GDP per capita is strongly positive in the regressions for 
real minimum income benefits, but it is insignificant in the estimations of the replacement rate. One 
possible explanation might be that although governments put more efforts on social protection as 
income increases, average production wages increase as well, resulting in insignificant effects. 
Furthermore, the results for deindustrialization suggest that structural transitions on the labor market 
are associated with higher social assistance benefits, although significant coefficients can only be found 
for the short run. Finally, trade openness is negatively and significantly related to social assistance 
benefits, which provides support for the efficiency hypothesis. The results for capital openness are 
insignificant.  
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Table 3. ECM regression results in 21 OECD countries, 1990-2009 
 Real minimum income benefits Minimum income replacement rates 
Lisbon Strategy 2000 164.640***  90.663* 0.453***  0.319** 
 
[3.78] 
 
[1.79] [2.80] 
 
[1.99] 
Lisbon Strategy 2005  223.484*** 163.541***  0.517*** 0.299** 
  
[3.38] [2.64] 
 
[2.82] [1.98] 
∆ Left government 2.122** 1.772* 1.918* 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 [2.14] [1.72] [1.85] [1.33] [1.08] [1.21] Left government (t-1) 0.365 0.342 0.286 0.00 0.001 0.00 
 [0.73] [0.64] [0.54] [0.22] [0.29] [0.13] 
∆ Union density -26.447 -17.944 -20.607 0.162* 0.182** 0.173** 
 [-1.04] [-0.68] [-0.77] [1.93] [2.21] [2.03] 
Union density (t-1) 0.822 0.844 0.88 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 [0.87] [0.89] [0.92] [0.73] [0.81] [0.78] 
∆ Unemployment -177.199*** -182.577*** -178.505*** -0.322*** -0.338*** -0.325*** 
 
[-5.60] [-5.55] [-5.52] [-3.41] [-3.51] [-3.36] 
Unemployment (t-1) -26.262*** -30.244*** -28.398*** -0.047 -0.057* -0.051 
 
[-5.03] [-5.78] [-5.34] [-1.38] [-1.70] [-1.48] 
∆ Deficit -42.299*** -41.990*** -41.704*** -0.048 -0.048 -0.047 
 [-3.21] [-3.23] [-3.29] [-1.03] [-1.03] [-1.02] Deficit (t-1) -48.470*** -45.776*** -46.341*** -0.102*** -0.096*** -0.099*** 
 [-5.77] [-5.18] [-5.31] [-3.50] [-3.26] [-3.32] 
∆ GDP per capita*10-3 100.868** 114.904*** 118.846*** 0.053 0.076 0.085 
 [2.42] [2.67] [2.84] [0.34] [0.49] [0.55] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 15.305*** 12.519** 13.244** 0.005 -0.004 0.001 
 [2.73] [2.28] [2.47] [0.26] [-0.20] [0.03] 
∆ Deindustrialization 147.063*** 159.415*** 155.874*** 0.299** 0.325** 0.314** 
 
[4.29] [4.44] [4.46] [2.35] [2.48] [2.44] 
Deindustrialization (t-1) 2.642 4.654 2.937 -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 
 
[0.48] [0.81] [0.52] [-0.88] [-0.68] [-0.86] 
∆ Trade openness -18.944*** -18.607*** -19.276*** -0.031* -0.029* -0.031* 
 [-3.88] [-3.66] [-4.00] [-1.82] [-1.67] [-1.81] Trade openness (t-1) 0.987 1.007 0.734 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [1.46] [1.60] [1.05] [-0.35] [-0.19] [-0.50] 
∆ Capital openness -0.206 -0.25 -0.312 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 [-0.42] [-0.46] [-0.60] [0.71] [0.67] [0.63] 
Capital openness (t-1) -0.281 0.058 -0.129 0.00 0.001 0.001 
 [-0.44] [0.09] [-0.20] [0.11] [0.36] [0.20] 
Electoral system 132.515* 143.860** 133.752* 0.357 0.376 0.358 
 
[1.88] [2.04] [1.92] [1.51] [1.57] [1.52] 
LDV -0.019 -0.023* -0.02 -0.019* -0.021** -0.020* 
 [-1.50] [-1.79] [-1.57] [-1.89] [-2.08] [-1.95] 
Constant -510.845 -511.782 -439.825 1.91 1.988* 2.084* 
 [-1.34] [-1.28] [-1.13] [1.59] [1.65] [1.71] N 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Adj. R2 0.136 0.139 0.139 0.025 0.024 0.024 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in the parentheses.  
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Sensitivity analyses 
To examine the robustness of the results, we employ two sensitivity analyses. First, the benefit levels 
and replacement rates presented above are averages of the social assistance benefits of three household 
types, namely single persons, lone parents and two parents. As a sensitivity analysis, we run the 
regressions for each household type. The tables are presented in the appendix. The results are largely 
replicated.     
Second, the error correction models presented above do not explicitly control for country and year fixed 
effects. To examine the robust of the results, we utilize fixed effect models to deal with the 
heterogeneity of the intercepts (Beck and Katz, 2011). The estimated equation is expressed as follows: 
Yi,t = α + ∑ βjXji,t-1 +μi +λt + εi,t 
Here, Yi,t is the level of the dependent variable, α refers to the intercept and Xi, t-1 denotes the lagged 
level of the explanatory variables. We use a country dummy μ and a year dummy λ to control for 
unobserved country- and year-specific effects. Furthermore, panel-corrected standard errors are applied 
to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995). A 
Prais-Winsten transformation is applied to correct for autocorrelation.  
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4. The coefficients for the Lisbon Strategy 2000 are 
not significant anymore. The re-launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005, on the other hand, shows 
significantly positive effects. Taken together, these results indicate that we do not find robust effects for 
the Lisbon Strategy 2000, whereas we do find robust results for the Lisbon strategy 2005. This suggests 
that the Lisbon strategy 2000 did not have an influence on national social assistance policies, but that – 
in line with our hypothesis -  the re-launch in 2005 has increased the effectiveness of the Lisbon strategy.     
Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the results for left-wing parties, government deficits and GDP per 
capita are robust. In line with the results presented above, trade openness yields a negative effect and 
the negative effect of capital openness strengthens the support for the idea that globalization affects 
national minimum income protection via the efficiency mechanism. Finally, the coefficients for union 
density, unemployment, deindustrialization and the electoral system are not significant or even 
significant in the opposite direction, indicating that the results for these variables presented in Table 3 
are not robust for the use of fixed effects.     
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Table 4. Fixed effects regression results in 21 OECD countries, 1990-2009 
 
Real minimum income benefits Minimum income replacement rates 
Lisbon Strategy 2000 111.556 
 
31.736 0.65 
 
0.302 
 
[0.56] 
 
[0.19] [0.63] 
 
[0.38] 
Lisbon Strategy 2005 
 
402.764** 396.186* 
 
2.503*** 2.466*** 
  
[2.07] [1.94] 
 
[2.97] [2.89] 
Left government (t-1) 3.807*** 3.767*** 3.759*** 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
[2.99] [3.02] [3.01] [1.24] [1.21] [1.19] 
Union density (t-1) -113.591*** -113.102*** -113.150*** 0.017 0.01 0.009 
 
[-4.50] [-4.43] [-4.42] [0.21] [0.12] [0.10] 
Unemployment (t-1) 63.629 62.399 63.165 0.21 0.192 0.198 
 
[1.30] [1.27] [1.27] [1.60] [1.41] [1.43] 
Deficit (t-1) -61.417*** -59.549*** -59.349*** -0.158*** -0.154** -0.153** 
 
[-2.76] [-2.69] [-2.67] [-2.66] [-2.56] [-2.52] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 101.798** 103.802** 103.931** -0.035 -0.02 -0.018 
 
[2.08] [2.14] [2.14] [-0.20] [-0.12] [-0.11] 
Deindustrialization (t-1) -33.879 -33.941 -34.232 -0.466** -0.446** -0.445** 
 
[-0.51] [-0.51] [-0.51] [-2.39] [-2.28] [-2.28] 
Trade openness (t-1) -25.683** -27.824*** -27.948*** -0.065** -0.081*** -0.083*** 
 
[-2.31] [-2.64] [-2.60] [-2.05] [-2.77] [-2.80] 
Capital openness (t-1) -4.084** -4.021** -4.021** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 
[-2.37] [-2.33] [-2.33] [-2.46] [-2.34] [-2.34] 
Electoral system -392.429 -367.434 -363.736 0.708 0.688 0.697 
 
[-0.75] [-0.66] [-0.66] [0.31] [0.29] [0.30] 
Constant 18496.25*** 18510.04*** 18534.11*** 84.958*** 84.129*** 84.177*** 
 
[3.72] [3.69] [3.70] [5.01] [4.98] [4.98] 
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.829 0.829 0.829 0.864 0.869 0.869 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation [AR(1) disturbances]. 
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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5. Conclusions and discussion 
The literature on the Europeanization of social protection has been mainly focused on national labor 
market policies. In contrast, far less research has been devoted to the impact of the Lisbon Strategy on 
reforms of social assistance benefit schemes. In this paper, we examine the determinants of the variation 
in the development of social assistance benefits across 14 Western European countries and 7 non-
European countries over the period 1990-2009. In particular, the analysis focused on the role of the 
Lisbon Strategy that was adopted by the European Council to combat poverty and social exclusion across 
Europe. The question is to what extent national policy changes can be ascribed to this strategy or, in 
other words, do we see a Europeanization of social assistance and minimum income benefits? To analyze 
this question we use pooled time series cross-section regression analyses, accounting for a number of 
political, economic and institutional factors. 
For the first years after the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, our analysis does not show robust 
associations between the OMC Social Inclusion and national social assistance policy reforms. This result 
is in line with existing case-study evidence (Graziano and Jessoula, 2011). Interestingly, for the years 
after the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, our analysis suggests that the OMC Social Inclusion has 
contributed to increases of social assistance benefit levels. This finding seems to indicate that the 
revision of the OMC Social Inclusion has increased its effectiveness, which is in line with the goal of the 
revision. Although these results are robust for different model specifications and two different indicators 
of social assistance benefits, we should note an important limitation of our analysis. Benefit levels and 
replacement rates provide an indication of only one dimension of social assistance policies. Variation in 
other institutional characteristics, such as activation requirements for instance, are not taken into 
account. 
Finally, a remaining question is how the interaction between EU coordination and national social policies 
will progress given recent European developments. With the adoption of the Europe 2020 Strategy and 
the European Semester, the coordination of social policies is under development (Bekker and Klosse, 
2013; Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2014). Simultaneously, in many countries the economic crisis has triggered 
substantial austerity programs and major welfare state reforms. Future research should shed more light 
on the developments of minimum income protection.    
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Table A1: ECM regression results for single persons, 1990-2009 
 Real minimum income benefits for single 
 
Minimum income replacement rates for 
  Lisbon Strategy 2000 63.644**  29.623 0.168  0.105 
 [2.19]  [0.91] [1.57]  [0.96] Lisbon Strategy 2005  95.420** 76.755*  0.213* 0.143 
  [2.55] [1.86]  [1.94] [1.29] 
∆ Left government 1.341*** 1.210** 1.253** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005*** 
 [2.73] [2.41] [2.48] [2.71] [2.57] [2.61] 
Left government (t-1) 0.203 0.203 0.172 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.73] [0.67] [0.58] [1.03] [1.05] [0.97] 
∆ Union density -12.306 -8.717 -9.673 0.097* 0.105* 0.102* 
 
[-0.95] [-0.66] [-0.72] [1.73] [1.89] [1.80] 
Union density (t-1) 1.041** 1.021* 1.062** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[2.00] [1.94] [2.01] [0.69] [0.67] [0.69] 
∆ Unemployment -102.165*** -103.803*** -102.646*** -0.262*** -0.267*** -0.263*** 
 [-5.74] [-5.90] [-5.80] [-4.13] [-4.26] [-4.16] Unemployment (t-1) -16.859*** -18.282*** -17.780*** -0.025* -0.029** -0.027** 
 [-4.83] [-5.63] [-5.42] [-1.83] [-2.25] [-2.02] 
∆ Deficit -22.169*** -21.877*** -21.937*** -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 
 [-3.03] [-3.04] [-3.10] [-0.76] [-0.76] [-0.76] 
Deficit (t-1) -28.064*** -26.767*** -27.053*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.059*** 
 [-6.40] [-5.81] [-5.94] [-3.20] [-3.02] [-3.05] 
∆ GDP per capita*10-3 30.024 37.761 38.955 -0.039 -0.025 -0.023 
 
[1.13] [1.44] [1.50] [-0.45] [-0.29] [-0.26] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 7.362*** 6.133*** 6.359*** 0.003 0.00 0.001 
 
[3.00] [2.64] [2.74] [0.30] [-0.00] [0.13] 
∆ Deindustrialization 66.285*** 71.814*** 70.406*** 0.232*** 0.244*** 0.239*** 
 [3.39] [3.66] [3.63] [3.13] [3.23] [3.18] Deindustrialization (t-1) 2.442 3.09 2.456 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
 [0.96] [1.17] [0.95] [-1.39] [-1.30] [-1.38] 
∆ Trade openness -8.623*** -8.614*** -8.828*** -0.020* -0.020* -0.021* 
 [-2.70] [-2.63] [-2.75] [-1.75] [-1.72] [-1.78] 
Trade openness (t-1) 1.266*** 1.262*** 1.143** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [2.84] [3.05] [2.54] [0.56] [0.65] [0.38] 
∆ Capital openness 0.044 0.004 -0.015 0.001 0.001 0.00 
 
[0.15] [0.01] [-0.05] [0.43] [0.37] [0.34] 
Capital openness (t-1) -0.066 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
[-0.19] [0.14] [-0.03] [0.03] [0.20] [0.09] 
Electoral system 95.898*** 100.576*** 95.201*** 0.241*** 0.248*** 0.238** 
 [4.40] [4.55] [4.46] [2.58] [2.61] [2.54] LDV -0.017** -0.019*** -0.017** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** 
 [-2.48] [-2.75] [-2.52] [-2.08] [-2.13] [-2.02] Constant -402.014** -397.581** -363.192** 1.394 1.406 1.469 
 [-2.30] [-2.17] [-2.05] [1.53] [1.55] [1.59] 
N 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Adj. R2 0.136 0.126 0.124 0.026 0.027 0.024 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in the parentheses.  
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Table A2: ECM regression results for lone parents, 1990-2009 
 Real minimum income benefits for lone 
 
Minimum income replacement rates for lone 
 Lisbon Strategy 2000 190.254***  106.890** 0.545***  0.389** 
 [4.30]  [2.00] [3.50]  [2.45] Lisbon Strategy 2005  255.187*** 184.193***  0.615*** 0.348** 
  [3.63] [2.91]  [3.22] [2.13] 
∆ Left government 1.361 0.961 1.13 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 
 [1.15] [0.79] [0.92] [-0.12] [-0.38] [-0.23] 
Left government (t-1) -0.04 -0.076 -0.133 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 [-0.07] [-0.13] [-0.22] [-1.34] [-1.31] [-1.44] 
∆ Union density -39.286 -29.536 -32.68 0.138 0.162 0.151 
 
[-1.31] [-0.96] [-1.04] [1.37] [1.63] [1.48] 
Union density (t-1) -0.806 -0.854 -0.759 -0.001 -0.001 0.00 
 
[-0.70] [-0.75] [-0.67] [-0.25] [-0.19] [-0.16] 
∆ Unemployment -176.573*** -182.914*** -178.086*** -0.242** -0.261** -0.245** 
 [-4.96] [-4.92] [-4.86] [-2.30] [-2.42] [-2.26] Unemployment (t-1) -30.715*** -35.481*** -33.185*** -0.062 -0.075* -0.067 
 [-5.17] [-5.91] [-5.41] [-1.41] [-1.73] [-1.50] 
∆ Deficit -60.095*** -60.075*** -59.501*** -0.102** -0.103** -0.101** 
 [-3.96] [-4.03] [-4.08] [-2.13] [-2.14] [-2.13] 
Deficit (t-1) -50.338*** -47.612*** -48.036*** -0.104*** -0.097*** -0.099*** 
 [-4.87] [-4.39] [-4.50] [-3.51] [-3.23] [-3.31] 
∆ GDP per capita*10-3 137.965*** 153.380*** 158.063*** 0.126 0.15 0.162 
 
[2.80] [3.01] [3.19] [0.75] [0.89] [0.97] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 14.967** 11.580* 12.596** -0.004 -0.016 -0.01 
 
[2.45] [1.93] [2.16] [-0.19] [-0.64] [-0.40] 
∆ Deindustrialization 143.795*** 156.810*** 153.420*** 0.191 0.219 0.208 
 [3.69] [3.87] [3.88] [1.29] [1.44] [1.40] Deindustrialization (t-1) 4.924 7.294 5.284 -0.006 0.00 -0.005 
 [0.74] [1.05] [0.78] [-0.25] [-0.00] [-0.22] 
∆ Trade openness -21.695*** -21.325*** -22.072*** -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 
 [-4.15] [-3.94] [-4.33] [-1.61] [-1.45] [-1.61] 
Trade openness (t-1) 0.633 0.647 0.342 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.74] [0.81] [0.39] [-0.89] [-0.73] [-1.04] 
∆ Capital openness -0.202 -0.241 -0.317 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
[-0.37] [-0.40] [-0.55] [1.08] [1.06] [1.01] 
Capital openness (t-1) -0.159 0.242 0.017 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
[-0.22] [0.31] [0.02] [0.49] [0.77] [0.58] 
Electoral system 150.698 161.403 151.629 0.457 0.478 0.459 
 [1.50] [1.61] [1.52] [1.37] [1.43] [1.38] LDV -0.018 -0.022 -0.019 -0.027** -0.030** -0.028** 
 [-1.23] [-1.49] [-1.29] [-2.08] [-2.29] [-2.12] 
Constant -582.26 -575.687 -500.204 1.902 2.028 2.121 
 [-1.25] [-1.18] [-1.05] [1.48] [1.56] [1.62] 
N 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Adj. R2 0.140 0.143 0.144 0.028 0.026 0.027 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in the parentheses.  
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Table A3: ECM regression results for two parents, 1990-2009 
 Real minimum income benefits for two parents Minimum income replacement rates for two 
 Lisbon Strategy 2000 251.169***  149.537* 0.659***  0.464* 
 [3.81]  [1.93] [2.66]  [1.81] Lisbon Strategy 2005  326.715*** 225.518**  0.760*** 0.442* 
  [3.26] [2.50]  [2.64] [1.79] 
∆ Left government 3.807** 3.295** 3.520** 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 [2.36] [1.97] [2.10] [1.42] [1.21] [1.30] 
Left government (t-1) 1.052 1.04 0.935 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 [1.34] [1.26] [1.13] [0.53] [0.63] [0.43] 
∆ Union density -29.439 -17.553 -21.453 0.256** 0.284** 0.273** 
 
[-0.82] [-0.47] [-0.57] [2.17] [2.42] [2.26] 
Union density (t-1) 2.035 2.175 2.164 0.009 0.01 0.01 
 
[1.37] [1.47] [1.42] [1.32] [1.35] [1.37] 
∆ Unemployment -250.441*** -258.993*** -252.385*** -0.474*** -0.496*** -0.478*** 
 [-5.46] [-5.37] [-5.37] [-3.36] [-3.42] [-3.30] Unemployment (t-1) -29.844*** -35.679*** -32.827*** -0.064 -0.078 -0.071 
 [-3.38] [-3.90] [-3.60] [-1.23] [-1.48] [-1.33] 
∆ Deficit -45.479** -45.365** -44.666** -0.02 -0.021 -0.018 
 [-2.11] [-2.11] [-2.13] [-0.26] [-0.27] [-0.24] 
Deficit (t-1) -66.913*** -62.933*** -63.964*** -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.141*** 
 [-5.02] [-4.56] [-4.67] [-2.96] [-2.78] [-2.82] 
∆ GDP per capita*10-3 143.116** 162.679** 167.698*** 0.038 0.078 0.085 
 
[2.27] [2.47] [2.62] [0.15] [0.30] [0.33] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 22.820** 18.840** 20.057** 0.008 -0.004 0.002 
 
[2.49] [2.07] [2.25] [0.26] [-0.11] [0.05] 
∆ Deindustrialization 230.441*** 248.854*** 242.706*** 0.447** 0.487** 0.469** 
 [4.31] [4.42] [4.44] [2.22] [2.35] [2.30] Deindustrialization (t-1) -1.476 1.223 -1.096 -0.032 -0.026 -0.032 
 [-0.17] [0.14] [-0.13] [-1.05] [-0.87] [-1.04] 
∆ Trade openness -27.402*** -26.837*** -27.826*** -0.041 -0.04 -0.042 
 [-3.69] [-3.44] [-3.77] [-1.56] [-1.45] [-1.56] 
Trade openness (t-1) 1.013 1.062 0.649 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.99] [1.07] [0.61] [-0.47] [-0.34] [-0.61] 
∆ Capital openness -0.621 -0.697 -0.765 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
[-0.77] [-0.80] [-0.91] [0.64] [0.57] [0.57] 
Capital openness (t-1) -0.86 -0.389 -0.649 0.00 0.001 0.001 
 
[-0.80] [-0.34] [-0.59] [0.02] [0.22] [0.10] 
Electoral system 129.743 141.8 131.012 0.356 0.371 0.356 
 [1.23] [1.35] [1.26] [1.05] [1.08] [1.05] LDV -0.015 -0.019 -0.016 -0.023* -0.024** -0.024** 
 [-1.21] [-1.50] [-1.30] [-1.94] [-2.03] [-2.02] 
Constant -459.303 -449.612 -357.979 3.184** 3.301** 3.485** 
 [-0.83] [-0.78] [-0.64] [2.04] [2.11] [2.21] 
N 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Adj. R2 0.113 0.114 0.115 0.019 0.018 0.018 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in the parentheses.  
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Table B1: Fixed effects results for single persons, 1990-2009 
 
Real minimum income benefits for single persons Minimum income replacement rates for 
  Lisbon Strategy 2000 68.683 
 
25.393 0.442 
 
0.192 
 
[0.55] 
 
[0.25] [0.78] 
 
[0.47] 
Lisbon Strategy 2005 249.895** 245.522** 
 
1.253*** 1.250*** 
  
[2.13] [2.03] 
 
[2.78] [2.75] 
Left government (t-1) 2.024*** 1.986*** 1.981*** 0.005* 0.004 0.004 
 
[2.76] [2.75] [2.73] [1.65] [1.55] [1.56] 
Union density (t-1) -57.439*** -57.134*** -57.184*** -0.032 -0.025 -0.028 
 
[-4.47] [-4.34] [-4.33] [-0.53] [-0.39] [-0.45] 
Unemployment (t-1) 24.06 22.858 23.398 0.04 0.034 0.037 
 
[0.85] [0.81] [0.82] [0.48] [0.39] [0.42] 
Deficit (t-1) -31.581** -30.565** -30.409** -0.110*** -0.101*** -0.102*** 
 
[-2.48] [-2.41] [-2.39] [-2.90] [-2.79] [-2.75] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 50.748* 51.757* 51.823* -0.121 -0.114 -0.114 
 
[1.84] [1.87] [1.87] [-1.21] [-1.12] [-1.14] 
Deindustrialization (t-1) -13.079 -13.639 -13.778 -0.237* -0.238* -0.237* 
 
[-0.35] [-0.37] [-0.37] [-1.91] [-1.91] [-1.90] 
Trade openness (t-1) -5.561 -6.846 -6.936 -0.019 -0.024 -0.026 
 
[-0.83] [-1.05] [-1.05] [-0.99] [-1.29] [-1.35] 
Capital openness (t-1) -2.267** -2.227** -2.227** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 
[-2.49] [-2.44] [-2.45] [-2.51] [-2.46] [-2.45] 
Electoral system -189.473 -174.485 -172.179 -0.173 -0.056 -0.071 
 
[-0.90] [-0.74] [-0.74] [-0.16] [-0.04] [-0.06] 
Constant 9318.182*** 9377.559*** 9392.079*** 52.095*** 51.950*** 52.015*** 
 
[3.46] [3.49] [3.50] [5.06] [5.05] [5.04] 
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.841 0.839 0.838 0.874 0.868 0.871 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation [AR(1) disturbances]. 
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Table B2: Fixed effects results for lone parents, 1990-2009 
 
Real minimum income benefits for lone parents Minimum income replacement rates for 
  Lisbon Strategy 2000 77.101 
 
48.445 0.788 
 
0.483 
 
[0.39] 
 
[0.24] [0.77] 
 
[0.56] 
Lisbon Strategy 2005 
 
179.976 171.077 
 
2.141** 2.056** 
  
[0.73] [0.66] 
 
[2.23] [2.12] 
Left government (t-1) 4.245*** 4.217*** 4.216*** 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
[3.13] [3.17] [3.15] [1.03] [0.98] [0.96] 
Union density (t-1) -141.422*** -140.258*** -140.926*** -0.025 -0.037 -0.038 
 
[-4.91] [-4.83] [-4.85] [-0.28] [-0.40] [-0.41] 
Unemployment (t-1) 115.682* 114.504* 115.445* 0.368** 0.351** 0.361** 
 
[1.87] [1.84] [1.85] [2.29] [2.13] [2.17] 
Deficit (t-1) -56.645** -55.633** -55.601** -0.124* -0.124* -0.121* 
 
[-2.31] [-2.30] [-2.28] [-1.94] [-1.92] [-1.86] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 91.844 92.894 92.918 -0.017 -0.006 -0.005 
 
[1.46] [1.47] [1.47] [-0.08] [-0.03] [-0.02] 
Deindustrialization (t-1) -97.611 -99.439 -98.379 -0.615** -0.596** -0.598** 
 
[-1.09] [-1.11] [-1.10] [-2.52] [-2.43] [-2.44] 
Trade openness (t-1) -30.967** -31.569** -31.883** -0.073* -0.087** -0.089** 
 
[-2.01] [-2.17] [-2.16] [-1.72] [-2.24] [-2.25] 
Capital openness (t-1) -5.994** -5.961** -5.966** -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** 
 
[-2.33] [-2.33] [-2.33] [-2.43] [-2.35] [-2.35] 
Electoral system -501.641 -478.343 -483.64 0.629 0.492 0.534 
 
[-0.72] [-0.67] [-0.68] [0.20] [0.16] [0.17] 
Constant 25154.26*** 25237.85*** 25199.07*** 97.778*** 97.262*** 97.491*** 
 
[3.98] [3.97] [3.97] [4.97] [4.94] [4.96] 
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.829 0.827 0.827 0.871 0.877 0.877 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation [AR(1) disturbances]. 
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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Table B3: Fixed effects results for two parents, 1990-2009 
 
Real minimum income benefits for two parents Minimum income replacement rates for two 
 Lisbon Strategy 2000 208.912 
 
43.795 0.744 
 
0.182 
 
[0.66] 
 
[0.18] [0.48] 
 
[0.15] 
Lisbon Strategy 2005 
 
775.346*** 766.515*** 
 
4.001*** 3.976*** 
  
[2.97] [2.83] 
 
[3.36] [3.27] 
Left government (t-1) 5.080*** 5.012*** 5.004*** 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 
[2.64] [2.67] [2.66] [1.08] [1.04] [1.04] 
Union density (t-1) -138.511*** -137.708*** -137.875*** 0.115 0.109 0.108 
 
[-3.71] [-3.68] [-3.68] [1.00] [0.95] [0.95] 
Unemployment (t-1) 50.238 48.664 49.614 0.218 0.19 0.193 
 
[0.81] [0.78] [0.79] [1.30] [1.09] [1.08] 
Deficit (t-1) -94.788*** -91.069*** -90.854*** -0.237*** -0.227*** -0.226*** 
 
[-3.07] [-2.96] [-2.95] [-2.72] [-2.60] [-2.58] 
GDP per capita*10-3 (t-1) 163.966** 167.773** 168.009** 0.034 0.065 0.067 
 
[2.41] [2.50] [2.51] [0.13] [0.26] [0.27] 
Deindustrialization (t-1) 0.937 0.968 0.983 -0.547** -0.513** -0.512** 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [-2.21] [-2.09] [-2.09] 
Trade openness (t-1) -40.009*** -44.231*** -44.449*** -0.101*** -0.128*** -0.129*** 
 
[-3.05] [-3.54] [-3.49] [-2.61] [-3.55] [-3.54] 
Capital openness (t-1) -3.960** -3.838** -3.839** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 
 
[-2.32] [-2.26] [-2.26] [-2.33] [-2.16] [-2.15] 
Electoral system -428.028 -380.286 -377.192 1.747 1.805 1.816 
 
[-0.59] [-0.49] [-0.49] [0.52] [0.54] [0.54] 
Constant 21436.93*** 21455.92*** 21462.67*** 104.749*** 102.924*** 102.929*** 
 
[3.23] [3.22] [3.22] [4.37] [4.38] [4.38] 
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.813 0.814 0.813 0.838 0.845 0.845 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; Prais-Winsten transformation [AR(1) disturbances]. 
* significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
Simple average of real minimum income benefits and minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single 
persons, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. 
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